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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
GEORGE WALLACE, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20050192-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State submits this brief 
in reply to new matters raised in respondent's brief. 
REPLY TO POINT LB 
Defendant's reliance on State v. Lakey, highlights the magistrate's error 
in refusing to bind defendant over on the theft by deception charge. 
Defendant generally responds that evidence of his "history of bad debt," failed 
"expectations [of] any payments to his victims," and "involuntary closures" of his bank 
accounts" . . . "should [not] be a basis to provide a reasonable belief that he knew he would 
not have sufficient funds to cover the check written to Morris Murdock Travel," particularly 
in light of the "fact that [he] believed he would be receiving sufficient money to cover the 
'check.'" Aple. Br. at 9-10. In support, defendant relies on State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061 
(Utah 1983). Aple. Br. at 11-13. Defendant's reliance is misplaced. 
Defendant's reliance on Lakey highlights his misunderstanding of the bindover 
standard. In fact, Lakey supports binding defendant over. Lakey issued a check and asked 
his creditor not to cash it because there were not then funds to cover it, but that he was 
expecting additional deposits to cover the check. Lakey, 659 P.2d at 1062. The creditor 
accepted the check with this understanding, but Lakey's bank subsequently dishonored the 
check because of insufficient funds. Id. A jury convicted Lakey of theft by deception. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the conviction. Id. at 1064. The court recognized 
that there was evidence to support that "[Lakey] was aware that his promised deposit of the 
necessary funds was 'reasonably certain' not to be performed." Id. Lakey had issued bad 
checks before, and the three investors he was counting on to contribute cash had previously 
failed to do so despite repeated requests. Id. Counterpoised with that evidence, however, 
was uncontradicted testimony from defendant and his wife that (1) each of four investors had 
promised $2,000 in cash investments; (2) three of these had recently assured defendant that 
their contributions were imminent; (3) two had promised payment on or shortly before the 
weekend Lakey issued the check, which would have allowed deposit of sufficient funds 
before the creditor's check cleared; and (4) those same two investors actually contributed 
$12,000 in merchandise to the business at about this time. Id. Although the court 
acknowledged that it must view the evidence and its inferences most favorably to the jury's 
verdict, it was "still unable to conclude that reasonable minds could believe that defendant 
committed deception." Id. The court explained that Lakey was "not a case where the jury 
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the party who promised the deposit had no 
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reasonable prospect of being able to make it—i.e., was 'reasonably certain' that his promise 
would not be performed." Id. Compare State v. Hogrefe, 557 N.W.2d 871, 880 (Iowa 1996) 
(concluding that "jury could easily find that Hogrefe obtained [property] on the strength of 
the four postdated checks he wrote, checks that Hogrefe knew he could not cover," based on 
circumstantial evidence consisting of his prexisting $425,000 debt that he had no ostensible 
means of repaying and his unsuccessful insurance scam and subsequent bankruptcy). 
Here, by contrast, there is no counterpoise equivalent to that in Lakey. Rather, there 
was substantial circumstantial evidence that defendant knew the check to Morris Murdock 
would not be paid at the time he plainly participated in his wife's delivery and tender of the 
check: the issuance of hundreds of bad checks in the preceding two and one-half years, 
eleven contemporaneous bank account closures, an admitted debt of approximately $450,000, 
endless unfulfilled promises to pay victims, and undisputed testimony that there never had 
been enough money in the account on which the check was drawn to cover the check "[b]y 
a large margin—[thousands of dollars." R138:15. See Aplt. Br. at 17-22. Additionally, 
defendant's repeated assertion, that "[he] believed he would be receiving money to cover the 
'check,'" see Aple. Br. at 10, has no genuine basis in the evidence. The only support for this 
claim is a Morris Murdock's agent's testimony that defendant and his wife told her that they 
were expecting money. Nothing more. 
Moreover, as defendant acknowledges, Lakey concerned the reversal of a jury verdict, 
not a refusal to bindover. Aple. Br. at 13. The supreme court has explained that the quantum 
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of evidence necessary to bind a defendant over for trial is significantly smaller than that 
required to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt: 
We have held that the quantum of evidence necessary to establish probable 
cause at the preliminary hearing is more than [is] required to establish probable 
cause for arrest. To issue an arrest warrant, the facts presented must be 
sufficient to establish that an offense has been committed and a reasonable 
belief the defendant committed it. The facts presented, however, do not have 
to establish a prima facie case against the defendant. We have further held that 
the probable cause standard is also less than would prove the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, we recently stated, "[The probable cause] 
standard is lower, even, than a preponderance of the evidence standard 
applicable to civil cases." 
State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, If 11, 20 P.3d 300 (citations and quotations omitted; 
brackets in original). 
The evidence in the instant case is at least as great as the evidence in Lakey. But the 
evidentiary standard—bind over rather than a jury verdict—is lower. Moreover, Lakey was 
a close case. Two justices dissented in Lakey, concluding that a reasonable mind could find 
that Lakey was "reasonably certain" that the promised deposit would not be made and his 
check would not clear. Lakey, 569 P.2d at 1065 (Howe, J., dissenting, joined by Hall, C.J.). 
Given that Lakey was a close enough case to cause two justices to dissent and that it 
concerned the higher jury verdict standard, Lakey supports binding defendant over in the 
instant case. This Court should thus hold that the magistrate erred when he refused to bind 
defendant over on theft by deception. 
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CONCLUSION 
The magistrate's order refusing to bind defendant over and dismissing the felony 
information against on charges of theft by deception (count 7) and issuing a bad check (count 
9) should be reversed and the case remanded for entry of an order binding defendant over for 
trial on those charges. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^Tday of April, 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
W " KENNETH BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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